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Abstract 
 
In a stream of high profile announcements the UK central government has 
said that it wants to devolve power to sub-regions within England – to city 
regions and across the country.  This article presents evidence to show that 
the actual intent of government policy is the reverse.  Instead of promoting the 
creation of powerful, independent sub-regional authorities, answerable to the 
citizens who elected them, the government is seeking to impose a super-
centralised model of decision-making in which locally elected politicians are 
required to comply with central directives.  By drawing on work with city region 
leaders in England the article develops criteria for assessing sub-regional 
governance.  Inspirational examples of city region governance in other 
countries are presented.  These examples show that the current super-
centralisation of the English state is out of step with progressive policy making 
in other countries.  Suggestions on how to develop real devolution in England 
are outlined. 
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Introduction 
 
Public power in England is being restructured but not in the way Government 
ministers suggest.  The Government claims to be pursuing a policy designed 
to devolve power to sub-national governments in England – to so-called 
‘combined authorities’ in city regions and elsewhere.  Ministers argue, for 
example, that the Cities and Local Government Devolution Act 2016, and 
associated measures, are designed to deliver radical devolution of power to 
the great cities of England.  In this article it will be suggested that this is a 
deliberate devolution deception.  Ministers are not at all interested in creating 
a powerful system of sub-national governance, rather their undeclared aim is 
to super-centralise the English state.  Instead of giving local democracy a 
significant boost the Act, and the associated process of secretive ‘devolution’ 
deal making, is leading to an extraordinary centralisation of power in 
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Whitehall.  It will be suggested that, if England is to prosper economically and 
socially, we need an entirely new strategy for the development of sub-national 
governance, one that learns from abroad and leads to a significant 
strengthening of the fiscal and policy power of elected local governments. 
 
The argument unfolds in four steps.  First, it is helpful to retreat from the ins 
and outs of current public policy making and examine the way the 
centralisation of power in England has segued into super-centralisation over a 
period of thirty or more years.  Because this process of centralisation has 
advanced in a multitude of small, and not so small, steps it is possible that 
many citizens and, possibly, some policy makers and scholars, may not be 
aware of the way Whitehall has orchestrated a truly remarkable extension of 
ministerial power.   
 
Second, we identify the main flaws in the Government’s current approach to 
‘devolution’ in England.  Parliamentarians have produced several reports 
examining the performance of ‘devolution’ policy and they have not been slow 
to highlight the fundamental weaknesses.  Academic analysis has also 
highlighted a number of concerns.  
 
Third, we turn our attention to innovations in sub-national governance in other 
countries.  The Local Government Association (LGA) has become 
increasingly concerned about the over-centralised approach being developed 
by the UK government.  Early in 2016 the Association invited the author to 
prepare an international review of models of sub-national governance in other 
countries (Hambleton 2016).  Findings from this research are summarised.  
The evidence suggests, inter alia, that it is not necessary to have a directly 
city region mayor to have a very effective form of sub-national governance. 
 
The final part of the article draws out the key themes that emerge from the 
analysis.  It suggests that the UK government is falling, either willingly or 
inadvertently, into the trap of ‘seeing like a state’ when success in our 21st 
Century globalising economy requires governments to ‘see like a city’.  
Suggestions for revitalising devolution policy are put forward. 
 
The process of creeping super-centralisation 
 
It is difficult to identify exactly when the central state started to make truly 
serious incursions into local democratic power.  Stewart (2014), in his 
overview of the way local government in England has changed in recent 
decades, suggests that 1974 may have been a turning point.  He discusses 
the reorganisation of local government in England and Wales that took place 
that year, and notes that, at the time, the move to create a smaller number of 
larger elected local authorities was expected to establish a stable structure of 
local government, one that would herald an expansion of freedoms for elected 
local authorities.  This was not to be the case: 
 
‘Many in local government before reorganisation felt central government 
control to be excessive, yet the experience of the last forty years has been 
of centralisation even under the label of localism with the 2011 Localism 
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Act containing over 100 powers for central government over local 
authorities.’ (Stewart, 2014: 847) 
 
Stewart provides an accurate account of how, in the period since 1974, the 
power of locally elected politicians has been eroded.  He documents, for 
example, the way functions have been moved from local government 
responsibility and given to appointed boards, how the map of local 
government has become increasingly complex, reducing the public 
understanding of where responsibilities for government at the local level lie, 
and how ministers came to see local authorities as agencies for the provision 
of services in accordance with national policies, rather than as locally 
accountable institutions meeting the needs and aspirations of local 
communities and citizens. 
 
In a previous Viewpoint I explained how Conservative Prime Minister 
Thatcher, with her Rates Act of 1984, pushed through legislation that enabled 
the central state to decide, over the heads of local voters, how much they 
would be allowed to tax themselves (Hambleton 2015a).  This was, in my 
view, a key turning point in the Whitehall attack on local democracy.  The 
central state took the power to force elected politicians to comply with central 
diktat, even if this required them to disregard the expressed preferences of 
the voters who elected them.  In countries that value the importance of local 
democracy this idea of a higher level of government taking the power to ‘cap’ 
local tax-raising is viewed as incomprehensible. 
 
In 1984 the Joseph Rowntree Foundation became concerned about the 
uncertain and acrimonious relations then existing between local and central 
government, and set up a major research programme to study local and 
central government relations.  In the period 1989-96 over sixty research 
reports were published.i  Sir Charles Carter, who chaired this research 
programme, summarised the findings in a single report and concluded that 
elected local authorities must have ‘the freedom to do things differently’ 
(Carter 1996).  This fundamental insight is well understood in other Western 
democracies.   
 
In making this point Sir Charles did not adopt an anti-central government 
stance – the title of his report on local/central government relations is 
Members one of another.  But he was clear that central government should 
understand that it needs an inventive, powerful system of local governance if 
it is to succeed: 
 
‘… where leadership is especially needed is in promoting the idea that 
doing things differently is not a grounds for suspicion or rebuke or 
bureaucratic obstruction, but the essential means for the emergence of 
new ideas which can then compete for more general acceptance.’ (Carter 
1996: 81-82) (Author’s emphasis) 
 
Sir Charles concluded that at least 60 per cent of local authority revenue 
requirements should come from locally decided taxes or charges.  He also 
 4 
emphasised that ‘capping’, which he explained meant negating local 
accountability, should be abolished. 
 
A recurring pattern in the shift from centralisation to super-centralisation of the 
English state is that opposition parties, more often than not, seem to forget 
their sterling opposition to over-centralisation once they have been elected to 
national office.  Here I highlight two startling examples.  First, in 1997, the 
newly elected Labour Government, led by Tony Blair, chose to retain ‘capping’ 
even though the party had campaigned on a commitment to abolish it.  Tony 
Benn, noted in his diary on 17 July 1997:  
 
‘Believe it or not, the Government has decided to continue the rate-capping 
of three local authorities…  having spent thirteen years denouncing rate-
capping as an infringement of local democracy.’ (Benn 2002: 428) 
 
Second, it is instructive to note that Greg Clark, now Secretary of State for 
Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, co-wrote a blistering attack on 
Labour’s centralised approach to government when he was Director of Policy 
for the Conservative Party (Clark and Mather 2003).  Their report, Total 
Politics. Labour’s Command State, is a lucid analysis of four drivers of 
centralisation: 1) Targets imposed from Whitehall, 2) Centrally controlled 
funding, 3) Bureaucratic audit and inspection, and 4) Rigid terms and 
conditions.  In the light of this analysis Clark (with his co-author Mather) 
concluded that: 
 
‘We want to create local communities where: … Local government is 
directly accountable to ordinary people, not lost in the complexities of 
Whitehall’ (Clark and Mather 2003: 100) 
 
Sad to say, it turns out that ‘lost in the complexities of Whitehall’ is a strikingly 
accurate description of the situation Clark created when he became a 
Secretary of State.  Those trying to design and develop arrangements for the 
new ‘combined authorities’, to be set up in May 2017, are required to engage 
in the preparation of Parliamentary Orders of mind-boggling detail and to 
negotiate mountains of case-specific detail with Whitehall civil servants. 
 
When he was Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government, in 
2015-16, Clark introduced extraordinarily complicated arrangements for the 
detailed control of specific sub-regions in England.  As the next section 
explains, the secretive and rushed approach to detailed ‘devolution deals’ for 
specific city regions, one that involves ministers deciding on the minute details 
of particular devolution bids, makes the Blair Labour Government’s approach 
to local government of the 2000s appear pretty much hands off.  
 
The main flaws in UK devolution policy 
 
The central problem with the Government’s approach to devolution in England 
is that it is not devolution at all.  The Government is more interested in 
defusing blame for their misguided public spending cuts to local government 
than in empowering elected local authorities to make sound decisions on 
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behalf of the citizens who elected them.  Ministers have deliberately avoided 
providing clear, measurable objectives for devolution, preferring a strategy 
involving the construction of ‘devolution deals’ behind closed doors.  On the 
basis of their own unpublished preferences, Ministers are picking and 
choosing which localities are to benefit from these deals.  Ministers decide the 
criteria, Ministers decide the contents of each deal, and Ministers decide what 
funding will flow to the selected areas.  The suggestion that this is a 
‘devolution’ policy represents a misuse of the English language. 
 
Importantly, Parliamentarians have noticed that the Government’s approach is 
misguided and they produced three well-informed critiques of UK ‘devolution’ 
policy last year.  First, the House of Commons Communities and Local 
Government Committee, in Devolution: The Next Five Years and Beyond, 
said ‘… the policy risks being rushed and appearing driven by a purely 
political timetable’ (House of Commons Communities and Local Government 
Committee 2016: 3).  The committee did not mince it’s words: ‘From what we 
have seen and heard, we are very concerned that the public will not 
understand who will be responsible for what in their local area,’ (34).  The 
Committee also takes the view that it is wrong to impose directly elected 
mayors on areas that do not want them: ‘… local areas should be free to 
decide whether an elected mayor was the right model of governance for their 
area.’ (p. 30) 
 
Second, the All-Party Parliamentary Group Inquiry into better devolution for 
the UK argued in its report, Devolution and the Union, for a much more 
thoughtful approach.  It noted that: ‘Progress to date has been piecemeal; 
devolution arrangements emerging through bilateral conversations and 
narrow constitutional amendments fail to take a view in the round’. (All Party 
Parliamentary Group 2016: 4).  The Group argued that the principle of 
‘subsidiarity’ should be applied to all levels of government, meaning decisions 
should be taken as close to local people as possible. 
 
Third, in July 2016, the House of Commons Public Accounts Committee 
weighed in with a devastating critique of government devolution policy. In its 
report Cities and Local Growth the committee sets out nine sensible 
recommendations (House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts 2016).  
The committee says that the Government has not thought through the 
implications of devolution for central government departments. The decision 
on ‘Brexit’, which came after the report went to press, makes this criticism 
about the failure to consider the implications for Whitehall even more 
troubling.  The committee also criticised the breakneck pace: ‘The speed of 
the process so far has already led to a lack of meaningful consultation with 
stakeholders, including local MPs, councils and voters’ (p. 6).  
 
Various academic studies also show that the Government’s policy is failing to 
empower territorial governance in England.  For example, Nurse (2015) 
examines the rhetoric around the creation of a ‘Northern Powerhouse’ and 
uncovers much confusion and little real progress.  Several scholars have 
argued that ‘devolution’ policy can be more accurately described as the 
imposition, on a case-by-case basis, of bespoke, contract-style agreements 
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on particular localities, agreements that will be very tightly monitored by, what 
can only be described as, an over-bearing central state.  For example, 
O’Brien and Pike analysed the ‘city deals’ introduced by the Conservative and 
Liberal Democrat Coalition Government, in the period from 2011, and 
concluded that: 
 
‘Regional and urban policy is being recast as asymmetrical and 
transactional “deal-making” and negotiation between central national and 
local actors unequally endowed with information and resources leading to 
highly uneven and inequitable social and spatial outcomes across the 
UK…’ (O’Brien and Pike 2015: R15) 
 
Sandford, having carried out an initial analysis of English ‘devolution deals’, 
comes to, essentially, the same conclusion: 
 
‘Accountability, governance and even geography take second place to the 
aim of improving central policy outcomes via a contract-style relationship’ 
(Sandford 2016: 1). 
 
It is difficult to overstate the degree to which the central state is now 
determining exactly what is to happen in each ‘devolution deal’.  The plans 
are for seven mayoral elections for ‘combined authorities’ to take place in May 
2017: Cambridgeshire and Peterborough, Greater Manchester, Liverpool, 
Sheffield, Tees Valley, West of England (Greater Bristol) and West Midlands.  
In each case bespoke Parliamentary Orders, prepared under the Local 
Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009, have been 
laid.  By way of example, the West of England Combined Authority (WECA) 
Order 2016 has eight parts and six schedules.  It is fiendishly detailed, and it 
is not the only Order that will relate to this territory.  As detailed negotiations 
proceed additional Orders for each ‘combined authority’ will be drafted and 
presented to parliament.  The super-centralisation process is not, then, a ‘one 
off’.  This process will continue year after year on an area-by-area basis, with 
Ministers deciding whether or not to allow specific combined authorities to 
make subsequent changes to their existing ‘devolution’ deals.   
 
A further problem is that the funds that will flow to these ‘combined 
authorities’, as a result of these negotiations, are vanishingly small.  Take the 
devolution deal that has recently been negotiated for the WECA.  This 
envisages £30 million a year coming from central government to the new 
combined authority, which will start work next May, and will comprise Bristol 
and the two neighbouring unitary authorities of Bath and North East Somerset 
and South Gloucestershire.   
 
Bristol contains half the population of the combined authority.  As a notional 
exercise, we can suggest that the city might receive something like half the 
funding, perhaps £15 million a year, from this ‘devolution deal’.  Not all bad, 
you might say.  But central government is slashing its mainstream financial 
support to Bristol, as well as neighbouring authorities.  The cut in central 
government financial support to Bristol City Council is from £201 million a year 
in 2010/11 to £45 million a year in 2019/20 – that’s a 78% cut.  If these cuts 
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go ahead Bristol will, in 2019/20 receive £156 million a year less from central 
government than it did in 2010/11.  True, a rising income from business rates 
should help to fill the gap, but a gaping fiscal chasm will remain.  In the light of 
these figures the ‘extra’ £15 million a year from the devolution deal is, of 
course, not ‘extra’ at all.  Rather it merely reduces the size of the fiscal 
damage central government is doing annually to Bristol to a cut of around 
£140 million a year.  Recall that the Bristol city region is relatively prosperous.  
The fiscal hit on city regions in the north of England, whether or not they have 
‘devolution’ deals, can be expected to be much worse because their business 
rate income is unlikely to be as buoyant as local authorities in the south, like 
those in the Bristol city region. 
 
Given the extreme, top down ‘do as I say’ approach being imposed by central 
Government it is hardly surprising that some localities have decided to walk 
away.  For example, the devolution deals in the North East, in Norfolk and 
Suffolk, and in Greater Lincolnshire have already collapsed, and there is 
uncertainty about whether deals for other sub-regions will be agreed in the 
future.  Leave aside the details of local struggles and myopic conflicts now 
disfiguring politics in parts of England, the central issue for those interested in 
delivering a real devolution policy relates to political accountability.  In a truly 
devolved system of governance, and we will examine some inspiring 
examples in the next section, elected leaders are answerable ‘downwards’ to 
the people who elected them, not ‘upwards’ to distant figures in higher levels 
of government.  The policies being rushed through by the UK central 
government are not in line with this widespread understanding of the meaning 
of the word ‘devolution’.  Rather, the directly elected mayors of combined 
authorities and the councillors who work with them will be, despite their local 
electoral legitimacy, expected to be directly answerable in all manner of ways 
to Ministers in Whitehall.  There can be little doubt that this is an 
unsustainable model of sub-national governance. 
 
Learning from sub-national governance in other countries 
 
In my new book, Leading the Inclusive City, I examine place-based leadership 
in fourteen different countries, and draw lessons from the experiences of 
some of the most innovative systems of local governance in the world 
(Hambleton 2015b).  This international comparative analysis of urban policy, 
and the changing dynamics of city and city region governance, suggests that 
the super-centralised approach to devolution in England is completely out of 
step with progressive policy making in other countries.  I found no other 
country that is pursuing such a top-down ‘we no best’ approach to city region 
governance.  In researching the book I discovered many examples of 
inspirational local leadership – in, for example, Copenhagen, Curitiba, 
Freiburg, Malmo, Melbourne and Portland.  In Denmark, Brazil, Germany, 
Sweden, Australia and the USA – and, for that matter, many other countries - 
we find elected local authorities making remarkable progress precisely 
because the central state is not interfering in what the elected, locally 
accountable local authorities are doing.  
 
In 2016 the Local Government Association (LGA) invited the author to prepare 
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an international review of models of sub-national governance in other 
countries.  The aim of this study was to widen the conversation about 
devolution policy in England.  The report is available in two versions on the 
LGA website: a short, accessible report for busy practitioners; and a longer 
research report providing a more detailed overview of the dynamics of 
devolution in England and a fairly full account of international innovations in 
sub-national governance (Hambleton 2016). 
 
Based on consultation with city leaders in England the report sets out six 
principles for good governance that could be helpful for those creating 
combined authorities: civic leadership; effective decision-making; 
transparency and efficiency; accountability; public involvement and business 
engagement.  There are different ways of delivering good performance 
against these criteria and the report explores some of the different routes. 
  
The international literature on metropolitan and non-metropolitan governance 
suggests that reform options lie along a spectrum.  At one end the solutions 
involve the merger of existing units of local government into larger 
municipalities.  In the middle area of the spectrum we find various 
collaborative arrangements designed to produce effective collective action for 
large areas through inter-local agreements, coalition building and/or the 
introduction of an additional tier of government.  And at the far end we find 
those who try to make a virtue out of governmental fragmentation.  From this 
‘public choice’ perspective, small units of local government should behave as 
if they are in a market place. 
 
By drawing on an analysis of successful city region governance models 
around the world, the report provides profiles of four models that have won 
praise internationally. These examples are chosen to illustrate reforms that 
can be positioned at very different locations on the merger-to-hands-off 
spectrum.  They are: Auckland Council, New Zealand; the UK’s Greater 
London Authority (GLA); Portland Metro, in Oregon, USA; and Stuttgart City 
Region, Germany.  These examples illustrate very different ways of governing 
large areas.  The six principles of good governance are used to provide an 
assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of these different models.  Two 
of the examples – Auckland and London – have directly elected mayors, the 
other two do not.  We can note that no examples of effective models of ‘public 
choice’ approaches to metropolitan governance could be found. 
 
In 2010, the New Zealand government abolished eight local authorities in 
Auckland and created a large unitary local authority, led by a directly elected 
mayor and 20 councillors. In addition, there are now 21 elected local boards 
that have responsibility for decision-making about local services.  The 
Auckland Council has a population of 1.6 million, considerably larger than any 
unitary authority in England.  It raises the possibility that it might be desirable 
to consider merging local authorities in existing English city regions into 
enormously powerful, unitary city region authorities. 
 
The GLA was created in 2000 and is a strategic metropolitan authority. It has 
a directly elected mayor and a London Assembly comprising 25 assembly 
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members. It is a second tier of government and the London boroughs 
continue to provide most local government services.  The GLA is widely 
respected internationally, not least because Mayor Livingstone had the vision 
to introduce a congestion charge - a tax on vehicles entering the central area 
of the capital – in 2003.  This measure has led to major improvements in 
public transport and significant environmental gains (Richards 2006).  The 
implication here is that it could be desirable to consider creating English city 
region authorities on the GLA model.  Such a move would differ significantly 
from the curiously complicated, and opaque ‘combined authority’ proposals 
envisage by the Cities and Local Government Devolution Act 2016 and 
related legislation.  There would be direct election of a city region mayor 
alongside direct election of city region assembly members. 
 
Created in 1978, Portland Metro is, rather like the GLA, a metropolitan level of 
government operating above existing municipalities. Voters elect a president 
plus six councillors to run the Metro, and they also elect a Metro auditor to 
hold the Metro politicians to account. The president appoints members to 
committees and commissions but does not have any powers independent of 
the council.  This model of metropolitan governance, which serves a 
population of 1.8 million people, is, arguably, one of the most effective in the 
USA.  Strengths include: direct election of the president, direct election of 
senior councillors, and direct election of the person responsible for scrutiny of 
the executive.  The introduction of such a model in England could enhance 
the collective leadership of city regions.  It would provide a significant boost to 
the power of citizens, as they would directly elect not just the senior figure – 
the President – but also other senior councillors and, interestingly, a powerful 
scrutiny leader. 
 
The Association of the Region of Stuttgart is different again. Governing a city 
region with a population of 2.6 million, and introduced in 1994, the directly 
elected regional assembly has 87 members. These politicians are elected 
using proportional representation, and the assembly chooses the chair.  As 
with the Portland Metro, this person has very little independent executive 
power.  A consequence is that the civic leadership of this major, and very 
prosperous, city region in southern Germany is guided by a strategic 
organization that is very accountable to local citizens.  This model provides 
more of a challenge for the English system of local government because it 
would require the introduction of a system of proportional representation.   
 
The international evidence shows, then, that different cities and city regions in 
different countries have adopted different models of leadership. In particular, 
this research shows that directly elected mayors should not be seen as the 
only way of organising the political leadership of sub-national governance in 
England.  On the contrary, if devolution is to mean anything, elected local 
councillors should be free to design and develop alternative forms of 
governance for combined authorities.  Welcoming such flexibility would open 
up creative opportunities and a variety of ways of refreshing local governance 
could emerge.  Note that, in all the models of sub-national governance 
presented in this report, all of them widely regarded as successful, the elected 
politicians are accountable ‘downwards’ to their citizens.  This contrasts 
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sharply with the present approach to so-called ‘devolution’ in England.  As we 
have seen the devolution deals agreed to date appear to be more like 
contractual arrangements in which local leaders are expected to be 
accountable ‘upwards’ for the delivery of specific programmes and projects as 
set down by central government officials. 
 
Developing a new strategy for devolution in England 
 
What are the implications of this analysis for devolution policy in England?  
Three pointers emerge.  These concern: 1) Ways of seeing, 2) Local/central 
power relations in England, and 3) International lesson drawing. 
 
1) Ways of seeing 
 
Firstly, it is important to bring a much more critical eye to current approaches 
to public policy making.ii The analysis presented by James C. Scott, in his 
insightful book, Seeing like a state, is particularly helpful (Scott 1998).  Scott 
shows how national governments, with their functional, single-purpose 
departments, have some of the qualities of sensory-deprivation tanks.  While 
they may be animated by a desire to improve the human condition, ministers 
and civil servants simply cannot visualise what needs to be done because 
their ‘ways of seeing’ the world are inevitably distorted. Scott argues that the 
very way that briefing systems, information, knowledge and power are 
structured undermines central government effectiveness. 
 
Warren Magnusson, a Canadian political theorist, builds on Scott’s analysis. 
In his book, Politics of urbanism. Seeing like a city, he shows that the 
problems run deeper than the well-known patterns of silo-thinking associated 
with departmental government structures (Magnusson 2011).  He reveals 
how, over the years, the social sciences have undervalued interdisciplinary 
studies.  A consequence of this is that many fine scholars, because they are 
devoted to particular disciplines, can also come to ‘see like a state’. An 
inadvertent consequence is that much knowledge creation in universities and 
elsewhere is fractured. His radical argument is that to ‘see like a city’ holds 
out many benefits and, in particular, it involves positioning ourselves as 
inhabitants, not governors. 
 
Magnusson’s analysis suggests that the power of place is significantly 
undervalued in modern public policy analysis.  The Royal Society of Arts 
(RSA) Inclusive Growth Commission, appears to recognise this.  Launched in 
April 2016, the Commission is an independent enquiry designed to make local 
economies across the UK more inclusive and prosperous.  While a final report 
from the Commission is not expected until later in 2017, an interim report has 
been produced that draws attention to the benefits of adopting a place-based 
approach: 
 
‘… the starting point of this report is that if you want to bring economic and 
social objectives together in practice, it can only happen locally, and that 
devolving power and responsibility flexibly is a key part of the framework 
we need to achieve this.’ (Inclusive Growth Commission 2016: 3) 
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The accumulating evidence suggests that any sound strategy for devolution in 
England requires all stakeholders to value a place-based perspective.  The 
Core Cities, an organisation representing the councils of England’s eight 
largest economies outside London along with Cardiff and Glasgow, has 
produced a report advocating the development of ‘whole place leadership’ 
(Core Cities 2016).  This is a helpful contribution as it contains a useful 
collection of case studies of effective place-based leadership. 
 
2) Local/central power relations in England 
 
Reference was made earlier to the major programme of research on the 
relationships between local and central government funded by the Joseph 
Rowntree Foundation, possibly the largest study on this topic ever carried out 
in the UK.  While the final report from this research was published twenty 
years ago it remains a study that current policy makers should revisit, not 
least because it deals with fundamental principles.  Sir Charles Carter 
provides a balanced analysis of the findings of numerous research projects 
and notes that, while complaints and rebukes may fly between central and 
local government, it is the case that: 
 
‘… policy-makers and officers in both sectors are doing their best, within 
severe limitations, to serve the public good.  It is a further function of 
leadership to encourage an appreciation of the problems of others, and to 
invite whose who differ to approach problems with quiet common sense, 
honouring each other’s contribution and welcoming a variety of ideas’ 
(Carter 1996: 82-83) 
 
The evidence presented in this article suggests that a common sense 
evaluation should lead to a significant rebalancing of local/central power 
relations in England.  Other voices remind us that the English state has 
become far too centralised.  For example, Stephanie Flanders, Chair of the 
Inclusive Growth Commission, argues that: 
 
‘… the government needs to: set out its devolution framework to give clarity 
to how devolution can underpin inclusive growth; provide sufficient financial 
resources to make it successful; include all parts of government in a more 
growth-oriented fiscal stance; and increase investment in social as well as 
physical infrastructure’ (Flanders 2016:15). 
 
It is to be hoped that the Inclusive Growth Commission, when it publishes its 
final report, will go further and support the case for creating a new 
constitutional settlement, one that will provide for lasting legal protections for 
elected local authorities.  UK local government leaders from England, 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland have drawn attention to the implications 
of Brexit, and have set out the key principles that should guide a rebalancing 
of power (Local Government Association 2016).  The three key principles to 
underpin a new constitutional settlement that they identify are: 
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 Establishing a principle of subsidiarity, which would ensure that power 
is transferred to the level of government closest to the people. 
 
 Securing and enhancing the legal position of elected local authorities. 
 
 Providing much greater fiscal autonomy for local government. 
 
3) International lesson drawing 
 
In recent years international city-to-city networks have grown significantly.  
One of the benefits of increasing global connectivity is that local and national 
governments can learn relatively easily about public service innovations in 
other countries, and can consider the possibilities for international exchange 
and learning.  In my new book I provide an extended international analysis of 
the many benefits that can stem from adopting a place-based approach to 
public policy making and, in a concluding chapter, I develop a conceptual 
framework designed to assist the process of international lesson drawing for 
cities and city regions (Hambleton 2015b).   
 
The presentation suggests that, in relation to topics like public policy and 
urban governance there is no such thing as ‘best practice’.  Places are 
different, cultures are different and political feelings are different.  It follows 
that approaches that might be seen as good practice in one setting could be 
viewed as unhelpful in another.  The main benefit of exposure to experiences 
in other countries is that these encounters can stimulate imaginative, fresh 
thinking in the home setting.  Interestingly the field of comparative public 
policy analysis is still dominated by comparisons between nation states.  In 
our rapidly globalising world, as cities and city regions rise as centres of 
innovation and influence, this approach seems to be rather dated.  An 
encouraging sign is that, in academic fields like city planning, urban political 
science, and urban studies more generally, international comparative 
research on cities and city regions is expanding.  It is, perhaps, possible for 
universities to become more active in place-based leadership in their home 
environment and, by making use of their international networks, to assist 
particular cities and city regions to interact with civic leaders in other 
countries. 
 
If we examine experience with sub-national governance in other western 
democracies we can see that the UK is trailing other countries in the 
devolution stakes.  But this does not have to continue to be the case. 
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Endnotes 
 
i The author served on the Joseph Rowntree Foundation Local and Central 
Government Relations Research Committee from 1993-1996. 
 
ii I take the phrase ‘ways of seeing’ from the title of John Berger’s 
revolutionary BBC television series and book: Berger J. (1972) Ways of 
seeing. London: Penguin.  
